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As EU and UK negotiators meet in London at the start of the next and crucial round
of negotiations on an EU-UK trade deal, the British newspaper The Telegraph –
under the startling headline Brexit Deal Never Made Sense, Boris Johnson to Tell
EU – announced that the Withdrawal Agreement already concluded with the EU was
considered by the Johnson government to be ‘legally ambiguous’. The voice of the
Eurosceptic wing of Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party, the European Research
Group, has suggested that the Withdrawal Agreement be scrapped entirely in the
event that a trade deal with the EU is not forthcoming. With influential members of
the Prime Minister’s own party reminding him  that the European Union (Withdrawal
Agreement) Act 2020 – which gives legal effect to the Withdrawal Agreement –
contains a provision asserting the sovereignty of Parliament, a sentiment appears to
be growing that the UK can somehow rewrite or change the Withdrawal Agreement
through domestic legislation. 
As a sign of growing concern in the EU, the European Commission President Ursula
von der Leyen took to Twitter to state:
I trust the British government to implement the Withdrawal Agreement, an
obligation under international law & prerequisite for any future partnership.
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland is essential to protect peace and
stability on the island & integrity of the single market.
What has brought the issue to the fore is the publication later this week of the so-
called UK Internal Market Bill. The Bill was always going to be controversial. After all,
it has enormous repercussions for the exercise of devolved power within the UK. But
what has, instead, attracted headlines – and precipitated the resignation of the head
of the Government Legal Department, Jonathan Jones – is whether aspects of the
Bill are incompatible with the Withdrawal Agreement agreed between the EU and the
UK. 
Speaking in the House of Commons on the eve of the publication of the Internal
Market Bill and in response to an urgent question, the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland Brandon Lewis stated that 
‘Yes, this does break international law in a very specific and limited way.
We are taking the power to disapply the EU law concept of direct effect
required by Article 4 in a certain, very tiny, defined circumstances.’
The focus of the analysis here is not on whether there is a substantive incompatibility
between the commitments made in the Protocol and the provisions of the Bill for
unfettered market access between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. That is
a matter for discussion within the Joint Committee established under the Withdrawal
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Agreement. Rather the issue is whether the UK can, by domestic legislation, limit the
direct effect of the Agreement.
Article 4 of the Withdrawal Agreement states:
1. The provisions of this Agreement and the provisions of Union law made
applicable by this Agreement shall produce in respect of and in the United
Kingdom the same legal effects as those which they produce within the
Union and its Member States. 
Accordingly, legal or natural persons shall in particular be able to rely
directly on the provisions contained or referred to in this Agreement which
meet the conditions for direct effect under Union law. 
2. The United Kingdom shall ensure compliance with paragraph 1, including
as regards the required powers of its judicial and administrative authorities
to disapply inconsistent or incompatible domestic provisions, through
domestic primary legislation. 
Albeit a treaty distinct from the treaties establishing the European Union and
to which direct effect has been attributed since the early 1960s, the intention
behind Article 4, paragraph 1 is that this legal instrument shall be capable of direct
enforcement before national courts. As the second paragraph makes clear, the
United Kingdom agreed to legislate through domestic primary law for compliance
with paragraph 1. But it also clarifies that the consequence of this domestic
enforcement is that UK courts are also to be empowered to disapply domestic
provisions that are inconsistent or incompatible with the Agreement. 
The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 received Royal Assent on
23 January 2020. In a rather inelegant way, the 2020 Act implements the Withdrawal
Agreement by making amendments to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
Accordingly, the provision that provides for the general implementation of the
Agreement is contained in Section 7A of the 2018 Act as amended. 
Section 7A replicates the formulation used in the European Communities Act 1972
(which gave domestic legal effect to EU law during membership), such that directly
effective provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement are available and enforceable by
virtue of the Act and without further enactment. Importantly – and again using the
same sort of legal device to secure the primacy of EU law during EU membership
– section 7A(3) provides that every enactment (including an enactment contained
in the Act) is to interpreted having regard to the need to give effect to and enforce
directly effective provisions. This device is intended to safeguard against any implied
repeal through contradictory legislation but leaves open express repeal by later
statute.
One other provision requires attention. Section 38 of the European Union
(Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 asserts the sovereignty of the Parliament
of the UK. In particular, section 38(2)(b) asserts the sovereignty of Parliament
notwithstanding section 7A.
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All of which brings us to the crux of the legal issue. Does the sovereignty provision
in section 38 allow the UK Parliament to pass legislation which would limit the direct
effect and enforcement of the Withdrawal Agreement (and its integral Protocol on
Ireland/Northern Ireland), or would such legislation be disapplied by a UK court
pursuant to section 7A in implementation of Article 4 of the Withdrawal Agreement?
There is a circularity to the design of the 2018 Act (as amended). Section 7A
clearly intends that provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement are to be enforceable
before UK courts. Once created by the Act, that effect is not dependent on further
enactments by the UK Parliament. Moreover, section 7A(3) clearly intends that
future enactments – and that would include a UK Internal Market Bill – are to be
interpreted consistent with the duty to give domestic legal effect to the Withdrawal
Agreement. And yet, that intention is qualified by an assertion of the sovereignty of
the UK Parliament in section 38. 
Two lines of argument present themselves. 
The first would be to argue that the assertion of sovereignty is too general to permit
legislation that is contrary to the Withdrawal Agreement. Article 4 clearly envisages
the possibility that UK courts would have to disapply inconsistent domestic provision,
for which outcome the UK agreed to legislate. This is what section 7A achieves and
what Parliament intends. A general assertation of sovereignty in section 38 does
not produce a specific normative claim capable of trumping the clear and precise
obligations contained in the Withdrawal Agreement. It would, therefore, remain the
duty of the UK courts to disapply inconsistent provisions of a UK Internal Market Act. 
The alternative argument would be that to be protected by section 38, the UK
Internal Market legislation would need to be express in its intention to legislate
contrary to section 7A. A more subtle formulation would risk section 7A(3) being
deployed to interpret away any incompatibility. But the more express the alteration
of the direct effect and enforcement of the Withdrawal Agreement, the more obvious
might become its incompatibility with the Agreement, triggering dispute resolution
through the Joint Committee.
The reconciliation of the sovereignty of Parliament with compliance with international
obligations was always an open question during the UK’s EU membership. Litigation
posed, and sometimes, indirectly sought to answer, how that tension might be
reconciled, spawning significant academic deliberation. It would be ironic if we found
our answer in the post-membership context of Brexit.
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